



TechMUNIX

Crisis

**Fédération Internationale
de Football Association**

2038 World Cup Host Election
November 2026 · Brooklyn





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Letters from Dais



TechMUN/Jiaxu Zhao

Theo Mikesell
Chair

bthsmun.org/members/theo-mikesell

Welcome to TechMUN IX! My name is Theo Mikesell, and I will be presiding over the FIFA Congress committee as your chair. I’m also an upper level public speech & debate coach for Brooklyn Tech’s MUN club.

I’m currently a Senior in Brooklyn Tech’s Law and Society major, and a huge reason for my selecting that major was my participation in MUN. I began MUN in my Freshman year so I could argue with people other than my parents, and I think the experience has paid off because I haven’t lost a single argument with them since. In all seriousness, MUN has defined a huge part of my high school experience; I have

met so many of my dearest friends while preparing for conferences, improved as a communicator, collaborator, and larper, and learned so much about the geopolitical shoulders we stand on today.

We thought of FIFA Congress as a committee topic because it seemed like one of the quintessential examples of an attempt at global multilateralism being plagued with corruption, which reminded us of the UN itself. In that respect, I can’t wait to see how this committee turns out! Don’t hesitate to reach out via my email at the link above should you have any questions.

Emma Hannemann
Rapporteur
[bthsmun.org/members/
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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to TechMUN IX! My name is Emma Hannemann and I will be your rapporteur. I'm a junior at Brooklyn Tech, and have been in MUN for 3 years. I joined initially to help with my public speaking, however, it has become a great way for me to learn about historical events and how to collaborate with others.

I hope it will do the same for you. We are excited for you all to learn, debate, and collaborate in our FIFA Congress committee!



TechMUN/Jiaxu Zhao

Sebastian Kaye
Head of Backroom
[bthsmun.org/members/
sebastian-kaye](https://bthsmun.org/members/sebastian-kaye)

Dear delegates,

Welcome to TechMUN IX! I am Sebastian Kaye and am honored to be serving as your head of backrooms. I am a Junior at Brooklyn Tech in the Industrial Design major, and I have been a part of Model UN since my freshman year. Model UN has been my most active club so far, and has improved my confidence speaking to a crowd and people, while also forging some of my best relationships along the journey, highlighting why it's been one of the most positive experiences in High School for me.

I am also excited to announce my role as Under Director General for this year's executive board, but I am even more excited to see you guys work together, argue, and use your interpersonal skills to figure out the best bid to host the 2038 FIFA World Cup!



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Intro- duction

Section I Choices

The World Cup, hosted by the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), is one of the largest athletic events in the world, bringing together teams representing 48 countries to play against each other. Since its founding in 1904, the Switzerland-based international self-regulatory governing body has pursued its objectives of growing football internationally, ensuring equitable access, and advocating for fair play and integrity by hosting the World Cup. They also engage in other economic and social programs to promote grassroots football.

Every World Cup, one host country or region is chosen to host the tournament. There are many incentives for a country to host this event. Economically, the benefits appear to be many. For governments, hosting the tournament often draws international investment and tourism, while host cities benefit from new infrastructure such as stadiums, transit systems, and tourism.


Private companies can benefit as well: construction companies profit off of massive contracts to create stadiums, hotels, airports, and other accommodating infrastructure; local airlines experience increased passenger demand and the opportunity to advertise the event to promote their international prestige; tourism industries receive an influx of tourists, along with the ability to spike costs because of the event; local football clubs receive investments towards better facilities as well as increased prestige; and other companies are presented with massive marketing opportunities.

As beneficial as hosting the World Cup can be for the hosting parties, there are many potential disadvantageous responsibilities and ethical concerns that come into view. For one, many nations have to create purpose-built infrastructure to support the event, its participants, and its visitors, requiring immense public and private investment. In the case of the former, funding these megaprojects can divert public funding from infrastructure and social frameworks that citizens actually use to new stadiums, airports, and hotels. The construction process involves land acquisition and, often, demolition, relocation of residents, and redevelopment of neighborhoods. In some cases, the demand for construction and service work to facilitate such infrastructure opens the door to labor issues such as poor wages, unsafe working conditions, excessive working hours, and weak labor protections, with allegations of migrant-worker

exploitation arising on multiple occasions. In short, hosting the World Cup can motivate a country to engage in unethical labor and irresponsible land practices, create purpose-built infrastructure that is seldom used after the event, and open doors to further questions of the ethics of such harmful, steep investment for such a short period of use. This is all to say that the selection process for deciding who hosts the World Cup should, in theory, given the responsibilities and the potential benefits, involve an unbiased consideration of many different factors that deem a host party “fit” to host the World Cup. As you will soon learn, this has not exactly been the case historically.

The Growing Global Footprint of the FIFA World Cup

Past and future host countries of the FIFA World Cup



* Hosts of the first three matches
Source: FIFA

Statista, CC-BY-SA, adapted
Felix Richter, 37901



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Topic History

Section I Respice

FIFA held the first World Cup in 1930 in order to prove that a truly global Football championship was feasible; the tournament has since become a symbol of geopolitical prestige. Initially, FIFA Congress – a group of then seven founding football associations, that number steadily growing to 211 – decided on who would host by a simple vote, pursuant to no true criteria. As the World Cup grew in popularity and prestige, the number of members in FIFA Congress increased, causing the Congress-based bidding process to become expensive, contentious, and inefficient. Suddenly, over a hundred competing member associations had to convince their fellow associations why they “deserved” the prestigious economic opportunity and other countries, essentially, didn’t. This caused unnecessary work and worry, as well as consuming a lot of funds, making it so that up-and-coming football nations had basically no chance of winning hosting rights.

It was partially for these reasons that in 1964, Congress approved a proposal that future World Cup venues would be selected by the Executive Committee rather than Congress. Importantly, Congress didn't come up with this proposal; the FIFA Executive Committee did, and it was not entirely for these reasons. The proposal was motivated mostly by the prospect of giving FIFA leadership more control over bid evaluation, although it was also motivated by a preference that hosts be decided earlier in advance so as to have more preparation time, and to make the process less dependent on political relationships between individual Congress members. In any case, FIFA Congress democratically gave the Executive Committee the power to decide the hosts for the 1974, 1978 and 1982 World Cups without any real democratic check from Congress. As the World Cup ceased to only be a sporting event, this would become controversial.

The 1978 World Cup in Argentina is our first major example of the World Cup transcending sport. This tournament took place during what would come to be known in Argentine history as the Dirty War, a period in which General Jorge Rafael Videla killed an estimated 10,000-30,000 citizens. Although Argentina had already been selected to host a decade prior, many argued that in light of the human rights violations occurring, it would be improper to allow Argentina to host. Regardless, Argentina did host,

eventually even winning the tournament. Needless to say, this win proved extremely valuable to the Videla regime, which used it to spread nationalist propaganda and re-center Argentina's image away from the war crimes actively being committed. Granted, it also drew Western attention to the political conditions of the country at the time, allowing many foreign journalists to see the grim condition of the country and its people. Regardless, the 1978 World Cup set the precedent that who could host, participate in, and win the World Cup could carry a sort of underlying political message, reflecting the growing influence of the World Cup on the very world it 'cupped.' If hosting rights were powerful enough to give a nation actively committing human rights violations international attention, funding, and new content for nationalist propaganda, wasn't the opaque decision to give them those hosting rights a sort of political endorsement?

Essentially, as World Cup hosting rights became increasingly valuable commercial and geopolitical assets, concerns about corruption, conflicts of interest, and integrity in host-selection decisions grew: since 1966, instead of having to democratically petition the approval of fellow members, countries had far fewer people to persuade, and they now could do so quietly. This began a long history of corruption allegations within the FIFA Executive Committee, ranging from simple political preferences in the host process to accusations of bribery.

Al
Campeonato
Mundial
de Fútbol

Junio 1978

Buenos Aires
Córdoba
Mar del Plata
Mendoza
Rosario

Argentina '78



FIFA Collect



A prime example of both of these was in 2000, when FIFA's 24-member Executive Committee was selecting who would host the 2006 World Cup. When Germany won South Africa in a 12-11 Committee vote, it was alleged that the one abstention that prevented it from being a tie had come about as a result of corruption. This abstention belonged to New Zealander Charles Dempsey, who had been instructed by the Oceania Football Confederation to support South Africa, and had he not abstained and voted for South Africa, the tiebreaker vote would have gone to FIFA President Blatter, who favored South Africa, meaning they would likely win hosting rights. Dempsey subsequently claimed he was subject to "intolerable pressure," even referring to an attempted bribe. Although the validity of this was disputed, the subsequent discovery of a slush fund of almost six million dollars in 2015 raised further speculation, with critics claiming it was used to bribe four members of the FIFA bidding committee. The German Football Association would later be fined \$128,000 for tax evasion after they were investigated for possible bribery, with involved government officials facing similar consequences.

The 1978 situation involved human rights and ethics, and the 2000 situation involved corruption. In 2010, when the Executive Committee selected who would host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, the

intersection of these two issues came into play. For the 2018 World Cup in Russia, the United States brought concerns related to both of these to FIFA: according to U.S. officials, Russia had paid off officials to vote for Russia, winning them the World Cup bid; they also had concerns about the implications of allowing Russia to host a multi-national sporting event given Russian human rights restrictions and their ongoing annexation of Crimea. As per the former, the 2020 U.S. indictment alleged that Executives Jack Warner and Rafael Salguero were promised \$5 million and \$1 million respectively to vote for Russia. As per the latter, many political activists also had concerns about the crackdown on what Russia deemed as LGBT+ 'propaganda,' which many believed made the country unsafe for any Queer individuals planning on attending. On top of those controversies, there were actual casualties incurred in preparation of the Cup: in order to build the stadiums, Russia hired North Korean forced laborers in violation of international law, and multiple workers died. Despite the United States concerns for attendees safety, bribery, labor ethics, and the use of the World Cup for propaganda, the World Cup was held in Russia.

Decided just after Russia was Qatar, which was chosen to be the host of the 2022 World Cup. The first World Cup to occur in winter due to it also being the first World Cup to occur in the extremely hot Middle East, this decision was controversial from the

very beginning. For one, when FIFA awarded hosting rights to Qatar, they had virtually no infrastructure to host it. Thus, to prepare for it, Qatar had to rapidly invest in new sports centers, hotels, transport systems, and other infrastructure, most of which were made with the help of migrant labor. In addition, the government of Qatar was blamed for its laws and regulations on women and LGBT+ individuals. Despite changes in labor laws made by FIFA and the Emir of Qatar in preparation for the opening of the tournament, human rights organizations believe that they were implemented too late and not consistently enough. While there was colossal criticism around the treatment of migrant workers, citing violations of their rights, slave trade-era exploitation, and even cases of murders of employees, those outcries were consistently overshadowed by the tremendous publicity that Qatar generated as an emerging economic world power thanks to their World Cup hosting rights. Had FIFA Executives conducted human rights due diligence before granting Qatar hosting rights, this may not have occurred.

Even before the results of the 2010 decisions materialized in 2018 and 2022, the fishy judgement coming from FIFA was more than apparent to the global football community. This was exacerbated by the 2015 corruption scandal, in which U.S. and Swiss investigations exposed a much broader network of bribery, money laundering, and conflicts of interest throughout FIFA. The

alleged corruption extended beyond World Cup host selection; the Department of Justice alleged a 24-year scheme involving money laundering, racketeering, and millions of dollars in bribes. In particular, this involved sports-marketing companies that paid FIFA and regional football officials for valuable broadcasting rights and marketing opportunities. The 47 indictments brought forth by the U.S. Department of Justice's investigation ultimately produced charges against dozens of people and many guilty pleas.

This scandal, alongside the fact that there was obviously something wrong with the selection process, prompted the undertaking of sweeping governance reforms. In 2016, FIFA established a Reform Committee to develop organizational restructuring and restore trust in FIFA's global football. A new package of statutes came before an Extraordinary FIFA Congress in Zurich, and 179 of the 207 eligible member associations approved the package of reforms. On the same day, Gianni Infantino was elected FIFA president.

This structural package came with many reforms. In order to separate FIFA's political leadership from the day-to-day administrative organization, the reforms replaced the Executive Committee with what was called the FIFA Council, which came with more significant institutional checks and new independent oversight committees.



SAUL LOEB / AFP via Getty Images, through The Mercury News

Among these checks were term limits for senior officials to prevent FIFA officials from developing entrenched political networks, eligibility checks for people seeking senior positions, and greater financial transparency within the Council, requiring disclosure of individual compensation for senior officials, stronger financial auditing, enhanced compliance mechanisms, and greater scrutiny of revenue and spending. Perhaps most interestingly, though, these reforms expressed a formal commitment to human rights statutes, for the first time incorporating them into FIFA's governance framework, as well as subsequently creating a Women's Football Division. In 2017, FIFA

adopted its own formal Human Rights Policy and strengthened the World Cup bidding procedures, requiring for the first time that bidders explicitly address issues such as human rights, sustainability, financial capability, environmental protection, and government support. In 2018, those requirements were actually used to select the 2026 host. Importantly, under this framework, after the FIFA Council decided which bids were qualified, the decision returned to the FIFA Congress, which publicly voted to award the 2026 World Cup to Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

Although hosting rights for the 2026

World Cup were semi-democratically designated under the new framework, its proceedings were full of controversy. For one, the 2026 bid proposal had its own human rights controversies from the start, earning a human rights risk rating of “medium” in FIFA’s evaluation. During the actual tournament, however, other issues occurred. First and foremost, FIFA’s human rights promises were blocked by U.S. immigration policies, which blocked thousands of fans from entering the country to see the game. Although FIFA explicitly incorporated human rights evaluation into the bidding process, Human Rights Watch noted that FIFA and host cities failed to adequately implement it. On the field, there were other controversies. For one, after U.S. President Trump successfully petitioned President Infantino and FIFA’s judicial system to waive a red card, considerable criticism was generated because it appeared to many football officials that a national political leader had influenced a sporting disciplinary decision. Although FIFA maintained that its judicial bodies acted independently, UEFA staunchly criticized what it regarded as political interference.

This tournament also brought about several concerns about on-court behavior and disciplinary jurisprudence. FIFA ended up opening disciplinary proceedings against the Argentine Football Association over a range of inappropriate behavior by Argentine fans, including discriminatory, often political and sometimes violent chants and

gestures against Egyptian and Cape Verdean fans. Tensions mounted when Argentina played Egypt in the 16th round, when a referee disallowed an Egyptian goal against Argentina. Egypt’s Football Association subsequently complained to FIFA, arguing that the officials made “serious errors” and failed to use referee technology appropriately. The Association even went on to allege FIFA officials of bias, alleging they had influenced the match to keep Argentina and Messi in the tournament. FIFA subsequently denied all allegations, and did press charges against Argentina for its fans’ behavior, but the situation opened a different question about trust within FIFA’s allegedly independent institutions and consistent application of their rules.

In 2024, the hosts for the 2030 and 2034 World Cups were decided: Morocco, Portugal, and Spain would host the former, and Saudi Arabia would host the latter. Although the previous reforms had been implemented, both of these were decided by acclamation: in both cases, FIFA Council privately decided that each bid would be the sole candidate for consideration, so unless all associations in Congress abstained both times, those bids would win by default plurality. Therefore, questions are still being asked about both the competitiveness of FIFA’s bidding process and the reputation of the organization in general. Of particular interest and conflict is the decision to allow Saudi Arabia to host given the criticism faced

by the nation for human rights violations, including migrant rights, women’s rights, freedom of speech, and LGBT rights. In addition, there are worries about the working conditions of the migrant workers who are building infrastructure for the 2034 World Cup. Therefore, although FIFA claims that its screening process for bids considers human rights, and a more democratic process has technically been implemented, the credibility of what goes on behind the scenes of that screening process has been called into question.

FIFA’s current president is Gianni Infantino, another controversial character in FIFA’s history. When he was first elected in 2016 he was hailed as an escape from the corruption that had characterized the former president Sepp Blatter. He is running unopposed for his final term as FIFA president this year, though many individuals have concerns about his possible corruption. He is accused of breaking FIFA rules on political neutrality. So far 13 countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, England, Wales, Serbia, Finland, Croatia, Sweden, Albania, Greece, and Jordan) have made their opposition to his reelection public, citing his policy changes regarding the world cup. He is, however, supported by the CAF and the OFC has chosen to remain neutral on the topic. Unless something changes he is likely to be reelected as FIFA president, for better or for worse.




4

Current Situation

Section I Prospice

FIFA has yet to select a country or region to host the 2038 World Cup, and although that issue will be prevalent in this committee, it will not be the only one debated. Given the historical controversies, development to the selection process, and general direction that FIFA has been going in, it will be delegates' jobs to not only decide this aforementioned question, but determine what changes, if any, will be made to the framework for deciding who can host the 2042 World Cup and all subsequent tournaments.

In this committee, delegates will have two broader options regarding resolutions to pursue, and we will be thus accepting two types of resolutions. The first type of resolution will be the bids to host the 2038 World Cup tournament. Those resolutions will initially go to the FIFA Council (the committee backrooms) as working papers, which will decide which proposals make it



to the Congress floor for voting. Tentatively, FIFA Council will accept a maximum of three hosting bids to go to the floor for voting. Since some member associations are more preoccupied with FIFA proceedings and politics than hosting the actual tournament, the Dias will also accept a round of resolutions to change the rules, regulations, and frameworks of FIFA governance as well. These resolutions will not have to go through the FIFA Council.

Bid resolutions will be assessed in the backrooms pursuant to how FIFA Council evaluates real bids. Presently, bids are evaluated across five broad areas: event vision, which encompasses the overall concept for and legacy of hosting the tournament; infrastructural capacity or potential, including stadiums, training sites, accommodation, airports, and any other necessary facilities; services, including security, medical services, communications, mobility, and transportation; commercial viability, including revenue potential, commercial opportunities, costs of staging the tournament, and financial guarantees; and the environmental impact of hosting, ranging from the use of energy and water to

the long-term sustainability of tournament infrastructure. Since the reforms, bidders also have to address potential impacts on human rights in their bids, presenting risk assessments, strategies and commitments. FIFA Council designates bids based on completion of minimum hosting requirements, meaning, in theory, FIFA Council only has to find that a bid fulfils the minimum hosting requirements to be sent to the Congress floor for voting. The definition of “minimum” is only really articulated for stadium capacity, being 80,000 for opening and final matches, 60,000 for semifinals, and 40,000 for all other rounds. Other than that, there hasn’t really been an expressly communicated “minimum” requirement to fulfil beyond the mere presence of the requisite facilities and services. Regarding human rights, FIFA Council seems to only really require that a plan be set out such that human rights are adhered to and maintained.

Governance resolutions will not have to go through the FIFA Council in order to be voted on. As in real life, any proposals to amend current FIFA governance rules have to be sent to the FIFA Congress Secretary General so it can be worked

into the agenda. This is where many of the questions to consider come in. Is FIFA Council transparent and democratic enough? Should human rights be a binding factor in determining which countries have hosting rights? Is President Infantino good for global football? What relationship should the World Cup have with hosting governments, if any? All of these and more are questions that can be considered in governance resolutions. In this committee, the Dias will act as FIFA’s SecGen, so governance proposal working papers only need to be sent to the Dias before the voting time arrives. We intend to accept a maximum of four governance resolutions, but that number is subject to change given committee turnout. We would like a maximum of four sponsors per resolution (of either type) and a minimum of five signatories per resolution. Delegations can sign as many resolutions as they would like, but can only sponsor one resolution of each type.

As it stands right now, FIFA Congress is made up of 211 member associations, each representing football in their respective nations. This is not to say that, for example, the Uruguayan FIFA Congress member

votes on behalf of the Uruguayan national team; instead, that delegate represents all of the football associations related to FIFA that operate or reside in Uruguay. Hence, though there are fewer than 211 nations on Earth, there are 211 FIFA Congress member associations because that’s the amount of FIFA member associations accounting for territories, constituent nations, or otherwise not independent states in which FIFA-related football clubs operate. These associations do not necessarily represent their governments and the interests thereof, but having previously established that politics, nationalism and culture are inextricably linked to FIFA football, sociopolitical interests often find their way into the voting.



5

Questions to Consider

~11

To what extent should the bidding process involve FIFA Council and Executives?	Should some factors take precedence over others in the selection process? Which?
Should FIFA Congress have to consider a potential host country's record of human rights violations in the decision process?	Is President Infantino's leadership legitimate?
To what extent should FIFA aim to represent all regional members in who gets to host the tournament?	Do geopolitics matter in international sport? If so, to what extent? Should they be a consideration in the bidding process, or even which teams are allowed to participate?
Which factors, if any, should take the most precedence in the selection process?	To what extent shall existing infrastructure in a potential host nation influence their candidacy as a host nation?
Should FIFA Council exist? What, if any, accountability measures should exist between Congress and the Council?	What safeguards should FIFA implement to prevent corruption in the host selection process?
What criteria, if any, should disqualify a candidate from participation in the World Cup?	



6 Bloc Positions

A-C

Algeria

Having first participated in the World Cup in 1982, the Algerian Football Association prioritizes African representation in the global football community and development of grassroots football organizing. The AFA tends to be supportive of the incumbent FIFA president, though expressing some key political differences: namely, its resistance against attempts by traditional global north powerhouses to monopolize the tournament and support for the suspension of the Israeli Football Association from international football due to human rights violations and destruction of sports infrastructure in Gaza.

Argentina

Having won its third World Cup title in 2022, the Argentine Football Association leverages its global football superpower status to prioritize the preservation of South American football heritage. A staunch ally of the incumbent FIFA presidency, the Association has frequently led voting blocs to support its executive leadership. That said, it is in staunch opposition to FIFA-backed efforts to enforce traditional corporate privatization of domestic clubs and strict disciplinary sanctions levied by FIFA against South American teams for stadium crowd behavior.

Brazil

A two-time World Cup host, the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) has used its unparalleled legacy as a five-time world champion to secure tournament hosting rights for South America and further progressive human rights initiatives, pledging to block any 2038 host bids from nations lacking strict, legally binding human rights protections. Thus, the CBF advocates for a 2038 tournament location in which national sovereignty is respected and seamless international immigration and visa protocols for global fan bases are guaranteed.

Canada

A co-host of the 2026 tournament, Canada Soccer sports progressive, Western institutional governance, with heavy emphasis on rigorous human rights reporting, labor welfare, multi-national bidding coalitions, and transparent anti-corruption initiatives. Fiercely opposing extravagant, state-funded mega-infrastructure projects, Canada favors host countries that use pre-existing facilities, emphasizing fiscally sustainable, private-public tournament models.

C

Cape Verde

The Cape Verdean Football Federation, in close alignment with the Confederation of African Football, is a vocal advocate for President Infantino and the FIFA Forward Expansion Program, citing the potential benefits of foreign investment to transition African teams into sustainable programs. In addition to its fiscal stances as an up-and-coming player in the Football world, Cape Verde has leveraged institutional diplomacy through bilateral programs with nations such as Brazil to share institutional knowledge and resources across existing geopolitical partnerships.

Colombia

The Colombian Football Federation (FCF) leverages its passionate national fan culture and proven organizational capability to further regional South American representation, even hosting the 2024 FIFA Women’s World Cup. Colombia favors balanced, public-private funding models that refurbish existing urban sporting infrastructure without the detrimental effects on national public budgets. The FCF operates as a reliable member of the CONMEBOL bloc, generally supporting the incumbent FIFA leadership while guarding against domestic government interference. Colombia is likely to favor bids that guarantee strong fan-focused environments, reliable security protocols, and tangible infrastructure legacies for Latin American football development.

China

Having only qualified for one World Cup in its history, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) uses its immense market power and population to create high-budget mega infrastructure, while still restoring its aging Olympic infrastructure to promote commercial profitability. China strictly adheres to a policy of non-interference and national sovereignty, likely blocking hosting bids that weaponize civil rights reporting or independent media oversight against national interests. Thus, China would favor a bid involving highly commercialized, state-funded, multipolar bids that promise minimal political meddling in domestic governance.

Costa Rica

The Costa Rican Football Federation (FCRF) leverages its reputation as a peaceful democracy to champion environmental sustainability and extensive human rights protections within CONCACAF. Fiscally, the FCRF would likely favor green, compact, and low-emission tournament models over carbon-heavy, extravagant mega-infrastructure projects. Operating as a true independent voice, the FCRF will likely block hosting bids from nations with poor civil rights records or environmentally destructive development plans.

E-G

Egypt

The Egyptian Football Association (EFA) maintains strong institutional ties to the incumbent FIFA presidency, but fiercely criticizes the governing body over what it sees as selective enforcement of rules. Allegations of referee misconduct, particularly in the 2026 World Cup in Egypt’s round against Argentina, resulted in subsequent advocacy for independent observation of on-court decision making and imposition of transparency mechanisms. Additionally, after several incidents in which Egyptian coaching staff were admonished for politically-aligned gestures of advocacy for Palestine, the Egyptian FA, in conjunction with, notably, some prominent Egyptian political leaders, has accused FIFA of political hypocrisy and uneven disciplinary standards. Egypt isn’t likely to favor bids from nations that are hostile to its regional interests, supporting a tournament framework that ensures impartiality and political solidarity.

England

The Football Association (The FA) has come to act as a leading Western advocate for administrative transparency and institutional reform, frequently challenging Infantino’s central leadership bloc. In using the Premier League’s immense commercial power, the FA champions high-revenue hosting models that uphold human rights, labor welfare, and LGBTQ+ protections. Thus, the FA will likely oppose bids from authoritarian or state-backed regimes in favor of transparent, democratic, or multi-national coalitions.

Germany

The German Football Association (DFB) is a leading voice in Congress, routinely challenging Infantino’s executive overreach in favor of more transparent, democratic governance. The DFB prioritizes eco-friendly use of preexisting infrastructure (which they have and would like to use to host) over wasteful megaconstruction projects. As a proponent of human rights, labor protections, and LGBTQ+ inclusion, Germany isn’t likely to support bids from authoritarian regimes, unless they can prove that they meet those ethical prerequisites.

I-M

Israel

In Congress, the Israel Football Association (IFA) often defends itself from what it calls politically motivated attempts to weaponize football against it; most notably, the sanctioning of the IFA for violation of its obligations as a FIFA member association by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee. Thus, the IFA prioritizes a strict separation of geopolitics from athletics, sporting institutional neutrality with the backing of powerful Western allies such as the United States to block adversarial motions.

Japan

The Japan Football Association (JFA) is an environmentally and fiscally responsible voice in Congress which, in light of its co-hosting of the 2002 tournament with South Korea, advocates for the expansion of global football representation in Asia. Additionally, the JFA emphasizes high technical credibility, and is thus likely to support bids to host or amend FIFA governance that bring about more transparent host selection criteria, uphold human rights, and emphasize environmental effects.

Jamaica

Staunchly loyal to Infantino in exchange for developmental resources, the Jamaica Football Federation (JFF) currently finds itself in a financial crisis after failing to qualify for the 2026 World Cup. Thus, divergent from the continental body CONCACAF, Jamaica is a fierce proponent of expanded tournament models, dismissing dissenting European powers as disconnected from financial needs of developing football nations.

Mexico

The Mexican Football Federation (FMF) is a strategic voice in Congress, diverging from its own continental body CONCACAF in backing Infantino during executive crises. Following its role as a co-host for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, the FMF prioritizes national competition over regional cooperation; it's even been rumored that it has considered switching from CONCACAF to CONMEBOL in order to play against more competitive giants such as Brazil and Argentina in regional tournaments. Mexico is unlikely to support a bid that could strain its relationship with FIFA central governance and jeopardize its plan to switch continental bodies, thus viewing global human rights issues as secondary to its own relationship with Infantino.

M-N

Morocco

The Royal Moroccan Football Federation (FRMF) is a highly ambitious voice in Congress, famously spearheading a multi-decade campaign to break the traditional Western and South American duopoly over World Cup hosting. Before finally winning co-hosting rights for the 2030 World Cup alongside Spain and Portugal, Morocco bid to host five separate times, losing due to factors such as infrastructure deficits flagged by the FIFA evaluation task force and failure to unify other North African nations. Additionally, the FRMF is presently in a feud with Spain about who will host the prestigious World Cup 2034 final, to which it argues that its larger, more optical arenas make it entitled to those rights. Thus, the FMRF views hosting the World Cup as a way to promote national and international prestige, and is likely to use its victory to advocate for expanded pathways that give emerging football nations an avenue to host the global tournament.

New Zealand

New Zealand Football (NZF) is a reform-minded voice in Congress, famously diverging from the Oceania Football Confederation to challenge Infantino's leadership. Pursuant to that, NZF also heavily champions sustainability, gender equity, and strict ethical criteria, and is likely to support proposals for robust human rights vetting, environmental safeguards, and transparent, public voting systems for future tournament allocations, even if it means sidelining the Executive Committee in the selection process.

Norway

The Norwegian Football Federation (NFF) is something of a moral conscience in Congress, uniquely unconcerned with hosting and entirely focused on aggressive governance reform. The NFF often uses its platform to challenge the executive committee and its influence, having recently formally protested and abstained from the 2034 World Cup vote for Saudi Arabia, warning that human rights due diligence had been sidelined through FIFA's "opaque" bidding process. Presently, the NFF is also leading an institutional campaign alongside UEFA to suspend Israel from international football, citing precedent set by Russia's immediate ban to argue that maintaining institutional neutrality in the face of human rights violations in Gaza breaches FIFA's core statutes.

P-R

Palestine

The Palestine Football Association (PFA) is a relentlessly justice-seeking force in Congress, using international sports laws to challenge what it deems to be institutional hypocrisy. The PFA has openly blasted Infantino’s leadership, accusing FIFA of complicity in failing to apply regulations against the Israel Football Association regarding settlement clubs in the occupied territories and the devastation of Palestinian football infrastructure. PFA insists on the implementation of strict, rules-based sanctions against administrative overreach, national malfeasance, and selective governance.

Qatar

The Qatar Football Association (QFA) is something of a financial powerhouse in Congress, demonstrating an unmatched ability to shield and sustain the FIFA Executive Branch from scrutiny. Following its landmark hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the QFA prioritizes expansion of Arab and Middle Eastern institutional influence in sport, using economic connections such as lucrative Qatar Airways commercial flight charters for soccer diplomats to command loyalty. Having completed a \$200 billion infrastructure project for 2022, the QFA is likely to staunchly reject any downsizing models championed by reformers citing labor violations and environmental concerns. Instead, the QFA will likely favor proposals involving high-capital, centralized spectacles, arguing that massive commercial bids are necessary to fuel global redistribution funding to developing nations.

Portugal

Due to its diplomatic position between unconditional loyalty to UEFA and deep corporate alignment with the FIFA executive, the Portuguese Football Federation (FPF) avoids dramatic political confrontations, instead seeking to secure global development subsidies. This extends to the present feud between Morocco and Spain, which the FPF abstains from due to the conversation’s inextricable link to politics and reform. Thus, the FPF is likely to favor proposals that promote infrastructural funding and structural autonomy rather than roadblocks to FIFA Executive functions.

Russia

Despite its national teams being banned from active global play following the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Football Union’s (RFU) official membership and political voting rights were never formally suspended by FIFA’s executive council. Thus, the RFU congressionally supports Infantino’s leadership in the hopes that someday it will ease the nation back into international competitions and the UEFA. Despite the severe ethical, financial, and environmental criticisms surrounding the tournament, the RFU strongly champions the legacy of its 2018 World Cup and, alongside cash-heavy states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, is likely to continue treating soccer voting as a realm detached from international law and ethics in Congress.

S

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Arabian Football Federation (SAFF) has used its financial power to yield massive influence in Congress. Championing an aggressive “non-interference” doctrine, the SAFF is a staunch defender of Infantino’s leadership, defending multi-million dollar megaprojects and high-budget hosting criteria. Dismissing aggressive Western human rights audits as interference, the SAFF consistently votes against regulatory amendments that would penalize member nations over domestic human rights records. While, on paper, the SAFF defends global sustainability frameworks, its actual voting record and infrastructure strategy prioritize rapid industrial execution over greener, restrictive mandates. Thus, the SAFF is likely to favor bids that protect its economic interests over those that bring about issues of human rights, the environment, and corruption.

Senegal

The Senegalese Football Association (FSF) has aligned itself with broader skepticism towards President Infantino’s alleged inconsistent disciplinary procedures and FIFA Forward Enterprise, subsequently supporting a counterproposal that would distribute wealth to member nations. Thus, in addition to its opposition to host nation immigration enforcement policies, the FSF is likely to favor a bid for a more representative, equitable, and transparent FIFA tournament.

South Africa

The South African Football Association (SAFA) has maintained staunch institutional backing of FIFA president Gianni Infantino. Shaped by the 1976 FIFA sports boycott against Apartheid South Africa, SAFA sports FIFA’s strict “non-interference” statutes and views external political control as an existential threat to a nation’s standing in the game. Leveraging its hosting history of the 2010 World Cup, SAFA advocates for high-capital, expansive tournament spectacles that benefit developing nations; thus, SAFA is unlikely to support ego-frugal or downsized hosting templates sported by reformers, arguing they create unfair barriers that prevent African and Global South nations from hosting major events in the future.

S-U

South Korea

Having co-hosted the 2002 World Cup alongside Japan, the Korea Football Association (KFA) advocates for the expansion of football development in Asia. That said, bidding rights came after a long period of congressional rejection. Thus, while it would likely favor a bid from a nation with strong existing stadiums and transportation infrastructure, the KFA would also favor initiatives to make it so that such an infrastructural description applies to more Asian and developing member associations, without compromising human rights.

Spain

The co-host of the next World Cup, the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) balances massive commercial interests with defense of European democratic governance. Having their committee president recently suspended for sexual assault, the RFEF often votes in favor of robust, progressive safeguards and anti-discrimination codes to regain the respect and the support of global voters. Presently, the RFEF is engaging in rivalry with co-host Morocco over who has the right to host the prestigious World Cup final. Thus, the RFEF advocates for a merit-based infrastructure approach, in which organizational capability and qualification takes precedence.

United States

Coming out of the political fallout from co-hosting the 2026 World Cup with Mexico and Canada, The United States Soccer Federation (USSF) operates as an influential, deeply conflicted voice in Congress. Officially, the USSF champions democratic principles, with its Vice President publicly breaking ranks to blast Infantino’s leadership as corrupt; in practice, however, U.S. President Donald Trump’s direct lobbying to Infantino to overturn a competitive red-card suspension in the 2026 World Cup showed a breach of athletic neutrality, triggering international outrage and ethics complaints. Additionally, although the USSF promotes standard Western human rights frameworks, strict U.S. immigration enforcement and aggressive travel restrictions prevented more than half of Senegalese fans, media, and foreign athletic delegations from entering the country to see the game. Thus, the USSF is likely to align with Western European democratic proposals regarding the environment, economics, and human rights, but not on which entities can enforce them.

U

Uruguay

Fiercely leveraging its historical identity as the host and winner of the inaugural 1930 World Cup, the Uruguayan Football Association (AUF) is concerned with defending South American football prestige and heritage in Congress.

Uzbekistan

Leveraging its uniquely transcontinental position to maximize international development funding, the Uzbekistan Football Association (UFA) is a primarily infrastructure-focused, expansionist voice in Congress which would advocate for a Central Asian World Cup. A staunch supporter of President Infantino, the UFA advocates for a “football-first” approach to politics: advocating for regional unity rather than polarization, obtaining funding for the development of football in Central Asia, and avoiding the weaponization of human rights discussions, opting instead to support institutional initiatives like the UN and UEFA “Football for Global Goals” pact, though it would favor a bid that is sound in terms of adherence to human rights.



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And hope everyone has a great time at Model United Nations this year.



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