



TechMUNIX



Specialized General Assembly NASA and US Mission Control

Apollo 13
November 2026 • Brooklyn





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Letters from Dais



TechMUN/Jiaxu Zhao

Ava Todd

Chair

atodd1945@bths.edu

Welcome to TechMUNC 2027!

My name is Ava, and I am so excited to be one of your co-chairs for this year’s Specialized General Assembly committee.

I’m currently a senior, and Model UN has been a highlight of my time at Brooklyn Tech since I joined my sophomore year.

This year, our committee takes inspiration from the remarkable Apollo

13 mission, focusing on quick thinking, problem-solving, and compromise.

This committee rewards both diplomacy and creativity. If you have any questions before the conference, feel free to reach out to me at atodd1945@bths.edu. I can’t wait to see the ideas, energy, and collaboration you all bring to this room.



TechMUN/Jiaxu Zhao

Samuel Lerner
Co-Chair
slerner0025@bths.edu

Welcome to the Apollo 13 control room!

My name is Sam, and I'm excited to act as your co-chair for this Specialized General Assembly committee.

As a junior, this will be my 3rd year in Model UN. Joining Model UN in freshman year was one of the best decisions I've made in high school. While attending conferences and conducting late-night research have been the bulk of my Model UN experience, planning and hosting TechMUN will always hold a special place in my heart.

Our committee is, of course, inspired by the historic Apollo 13 mission. I hope that whether you are a major space enthusiast or you have somehow never heard of Apollo 13, you will discover your own path and solutions to aid the Apollo 13 astronauts.

Don't hesitate to reach out to me at slerner0025@bths.edu if you have any concerns, questions, or just want to introduce yourself. See you in November!



TechMUN/Jiaxu Zhao

Olivia Caro-Weil
Rapporteur
oweil2623@bths.edu

Hi,

My name is Olivia, and I'm very excited to be your rapporteur for our Specialized General Assembly committee.

This is my sophomore year of high school, and my second year of MUN. I love MUN for the emphasis on collaboration and diplomacy while also letting you stand out and become a leader, something our Apollo-13 committee will give you many opportunities to do.

If you have any questions, feel free to email me at oweil2623@bths.edu. I'm excited to see all the wonderful partnerships and opinions you all will bring to this space mission!

2

Intro- duction



Section I

Space Broadcast and Discovery

Apollo 13 Chain of Events

Humanity has always been driven by the desire to explore what lies beyond the boundaries of the known world.

From the earliest voyages across oceans to the development of modern aircraft and spacecraft, exploration has pushed societies to expand their understanding of science, technology, and the limits of human capability.

Few endeavors represent this ambition more clearly than space exploration. It is often easy to view space exploration as a story of triumph: rockets launch, astronauts reach the stars, and nations celebrate technological achievement. Yet behind every successful mission lies an immense amount of uncertainty. The journey towards space has therefore never been only a scientific endeavor; it has also been a test of leadership, innovation, communication, and human resilience.

On April 11, 1970, NASA's Apollo 13 mission launched with the hope of becoming the third human expedition to land on the Moon. What began as a routine journey into space would soon become one of the greatest tests of human ingenuity, leadership, and international attention in modern history.

Just two days after launch, a catastrophic explosion aboard the spacecraft severely damaged its service module and transformed a lunar expedition into a desperate struggle to bring three astronauts safely home.

The challenges of exploration become especially significant when success depends upon systems operating in environments where mistakes can have immediate and unchangeable consequences.

Spacecraft are composed of many interconnected systems, each designed to perform a specific function while operating

under extreme conditions. A failure in one component can create consequences beyond the original problem, forcing those responsible to reconsider assumptions, adapt existing plans, and develop solutions with limited time and resources. In such circumstances, preparation alone cannot guarantee success. The ability to make decisions under pressure becomes equally important.

The exploration of space also carries significance far beyond the scientific discoveries. Space programs have historically reflected the priorities of countries, technological competition, economic investment, and greater debates about the role of governments in advancing scientific research. Successes can show technological capability and inspire public confidence, while failures can raise difficult questions. At the same time, moments of crisis can reveal the importance of collaboration and demonstrate how scientific knowledge can be transformed into practical solutions when circumstances demand it.

The Apollo 13 crisis provides an opportunity to look at these issues through a specialized committee setting. Rather than approaching the topic solely as a historical event, delegates will be challenged to consider how programs and individuals respond when a mission is suddenly placed in jeopardy. Delegates will need to look at incomplete information, communicate across different areas of expertise, prioritize competing concerns, and make decisions while recognizing that every action may produce new consequences.



James Lovell, John Swigert, Fred Haise

The committee will require both an understanding of the broader context surrounding space exploration and the ability to think critically and adapt as circumstances change.

As delegates enter committee, it is important to recognize that there may be no perfect solution to the challenges they encounter. Scientific uncertainty, limited resources, differing priorities, and the pressure of time can make even seemingly

easy decisions difficult. Effective crisis management requires more than identifying a problem; it requires determining which information is reliable, deciding which risks you are willing to accept, and creating new solutions when conventional approaches are no longer enough. The ability to cooperate while maintaining clear leadership will be essential throughout the committee.

3

Topic History



Section I World War

Space has always been central to human existence, from ancient empires using stars as a map for safer travels to Galileo in Italy spending his entire life studying the universe, but after World War 2 ends, the interest in outer space increased astronomically.

The end of WW2 does not lead to a more peaceful state of mind for Americans but rather a more heightened fear than ever before. The fear comes from the increasingly opposing views of the USSR and the US on ideological issues. During the war, the two nations had allied to fight against the Axis powers, but soon after the war finished, the differences between the two nations became remarkably clear, and neither country was willing to compromise their principles or what they felt they deserved for the sake of diplomacy.

The tensions began to rise when both nations began to divide the Kingdom of

Korea, a nation that had been under Japanese control for over 30 years, as they divided the nation into two: half to the USSR to become communist and half to the US to become capitalist.

On June 25th, 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea invaded the southern half of the peninsula, and by July, U.S. soldiers were fighting for South Korea; by the end of the war in 1953, over 30,000 soldiers had been sent to the frontier to fight. The war was viewed as a war against communism rather than a war actually for the Korean citizens, and the proxy war became the first of many fights that would come because of the Cold War; a war where neither side directly partook in conflict against one another, but the threat of atomic bombs hung in the air for over thirty years straight.

Section II Space Contest

After World War II ended, the US found another uncharted territory into which they could gain new power, this territory being outer space. But before the US had made any headway into this expansion, the Soviet Union sent a satellite, Sputnik, into orbit in 1957; Americans were blindsided, and quickly the Cold War devolved into, more specifically, a Space Race.

In 1958, the US military launched its own satellite, Explorer I, and Eisenhower created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a federally funded program to get Americans ahead of the Soviets in terms of space exploration. Space exploration was especially charged because it was believed that if a nation had the capabilities to send a rocket into outer space, then they also had the power to send a nuclear weapon from across the world.

The Soviets continued breaking records

when, in April of 1961, they sent the first person to orbit Earth, Yuri Gagarin in Vostok 1. The Americans recovered by sending Alan Shepard into space, though not into orbit, on May 5th of the same year. The general feeling for Americans was that they were losing the race, and losing it badly, so more eyes were on the stars than ever before. That May, John F. Kennedy made the claim that Americans would land on the Moon before the end of the decade, and the lunar program, the Apollo missions, were created. The Americans then started heavily investing in space; from 1961-1964 NASA's budget increased almost 500 percent, and their lunar program eventually contained around 34,000 employees and 375,000 different contractors.

The Soviet program moved along on a much smaller scale due to internal conflicts and the death of Sergei Korolev, chief engineer of the Soviet space program in 1966, with many Soviet officials being unsure of the necessity of such an expensive project.

The Apollo missions began in earnest after that, with a huge mistake coming in January 1967 when Apollo 1, which was supposed to test the capabilities of the Apollo capsule in a low orbital context, blew up due to a launch pad failure. All three astronauts were killed in the fire, and that mistake was a sobering reminder of the cost of accidents; it wasn't just a political proxy war, it was people's lives.



January 1967, Apollo 1

All three astronauts were killed in the fire.

Due to a launch pad failure, the capsule blew up at the moment.

Kipp Teague

The next big mission was Apollo 8, the first crewed mission by NASA to orbit the Moon, which launched in December 1968. After the completion of that flight, on July 16th 1969, Apollo 11 was launched, the first mission to have mankind on the Moon. The successful landing of the shuttle on the Moon, called “Humanity’s Greatest Achievement,” more or less laid the Space Race to rest, with America as the clear winner. The Soviet Union attempted to send spaceships to the Moon, but none of them were successful.

After the success of Apollo 11, NASA wanted to capitalize on the momentum of the first lunar landing and continue expanding the possibilities of space exploration for humanity. The objective of the Apollo program was never simply to place just one person on the Moon. The missions were meant to gradually develop the technology and expertise needed for increasingly ambitious spaceflight. Each mission had different goals, allowing NASA to learn from previous flights and improve its ability to operate past Earth.

Apollo 12, launched in November 1969, was the second mission to successfully land astronauts on the Moon. Unlike Apollo 11, which focused on showing that a landing was possible, Apollo 12 put more emphasis on precision landing and scientific investigation. Astronauts Charles “Pete” Conrad Jr. and Alan L. Bean conducted experiments and

collected samples while Richard F. Gordon Jr. remained in orbit. The mission demonstrated that lunar exploration could become more systematic and scientific rather than simply a competition to reach the Moon first.


As the Apollo program progressed, NASA increasingly focused on what could be learned from the Moon. Scientists hoped that lunar rocks and soil could provide information about the origins and development of both the Moon and Earth. Astronauts were trained not only as pilots, but also to do scientific observations, collect samples, photograph the lunar surface, and operate experiments. This represented a shift in the purpose of the Apollo program. The Moon was no longer only a destination.

At the same time, NASA was beginning to confront the limitations of the Apollo program. The cost of sending humans to the Moon required massive government funding, and maintaining public interest became very difficult after the initial excitement of Apollo 11. The US had achieved the central objective President Kennedy had established earlier in the decade, and there was less of a clear competitive reason to continue funding expensive lunar missions.

The changing political environment also influenced NASA’s future. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States faced major domestic and international challenges, including the Vietnam War, social

unrest, and economic concerns. Government resources had to be divided among many priorities, making the continued expense of exploration too controversial. NASA’s budget began to decline after reaching its peak during the height of the Space Race. As a result, several planned Apollo missions were eventually canceled, decreasing the number of lunar landings that would actually take place.

The experience gained through Apollo would eventually influence future American space programs and shape the country’s approach to human exploration beyond the Moon. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Apollo program had entered a new phase. The US had already accomplished the historic first lunar landing, but NASA’s remaining missions faced a different question: how could the knowledge, technology, and experience gained from the Space Race be used to make future exploration safer and more sustainable? The answer would depend not only on the success of individual missions, but also on how NASA responded to the inevitable challenges of operating at the limits of human technology.



4

Current Situation

Section I

Decisions and Consequences

Aside from a few minor issues, Apollo 13 was appearing to be the smoothest mission of the program. However, 55 hours and 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission and 200,000 miles away from home, Oxygen tank No. 2 exploded aboard the Apollo 13 Service Module. A multitude of warning lights lit up, indicating the loss of two out of the three fuel cells, the depletion of oxygen No. 2, and the rapid depletion of tank No. 1. In response, the crew retreated to the Lunar Module (LM), which could act as a “lifeboat” in emergencies. Now, as mission control and the astronauts evaluate the situation, they have determined that the primary challenges are managing consumables, ensuring accurate navigation, and addressing any unforeseen issues.

The Lunar Module was designed to accommodate two astronauts for the two-day duration of the landing, not three astronauts for the four-day journey back to



Alan Bean

Earth. Maintaining the astronauts' survival is a top priority through management of various factors such as water, power, and gas buildup. Even in the most favorable circumstances, the crew is projected to experience significant weight loss and dehydration. Additionally, despite the Lunar Module having a navigation system, it was simply not designed for the task at hand. Just over twenty hours before the explosion, the crew adjusted their trajectory to attempt a lunar landing. However, now that course has to be corrected, with limited support from

onboard computer systems.

Beyond the known problems to be faced, delegates should be mindful that all decisions, especially in spaceflight, have inherent trade-offs. Effectively addressing this crisis requires delegates to understand their delegation's specific role within mission control, and how that expertise should shape their decision-making. It is the responsibility of the delegations of mission control to tackle this crisis as a committee, while staying grounded in their delegation's beliefs and values.



5

Questions to Consider

~6

When information is incomplete or uncertain, how should decisions be made?

When conventional procedures and trained solutions no longer apply, how should new solutions be established?

What is the relationship between crew safety and the broader goals of the space program?

How should competing priorities between different systems or teams be resolved when resources are limited?

How much should political, public, and international pressures shape technical decisions?

Should decisions made during the crisis only be judged based on the astronauts' safe return, or also by other criteria?



6 Bloc Positions

Operations

Flight Director
Gene Kranz

Responsible for directing the response to emergencies and coordinating flight controllers. Known for demanding decisive, disciplined action and prioritizing crew safety.

Flight Dynamics Officer
Arnie Aldritch

Over his past six years at NASA, he has built a reputation for keeping composure under extreme stress. He believes panic is the real danger facing the astronauts and that quick decisions could worsen the crisis further.

Flight Director
Glynn Lunney

A man who eventually take a major role in the Apollo 13 response. Represents an experienced Mission Control perspective and can disagree with other flight directors over how aggressively to respond to problems.

Specialist
John Aaron

NASA electrical, environmental, and communications specialist. Known for his exceptional understanding of spacecraft electrical systems and can become an important technical voice during an emergency.

EECOM flight controller
Sy Liebergot

Responsible for monitoring spacecraft oxygen, electrical power, and related systems. His interpretation of telemetry can heavily influence committee decisions.

Specialist
GUIDO

Guidance specialists responsible for navigation and spacecraft trajectory. Their priorities may conflict with engineers focused on life support because changing the trajectory can create additional risks.

TELMU Flight Controller
Art Campos

He is representing the lunar-module systems team. Focused on the Lunar Module’s capabilities and limitations, and can advocate for using the LM in ways it was never originally intended to be used.

Specialist
DSN Representative

Deep Space Network communications specialist responsible for maintaining contact with Apollo 13. Has to balance limited communications resources and potentially conflicting demands for tracking and communication.

Office Lead
Don Arabian

Chief of the Apollo Test Division and head of the Mission Evaluation Room, the engineering room responsible for devising and testing possible solutions to the many problems faced by the astronauts during the crisis. Focused on rigorously validated, tested solutions, he may disagree with Mission Control flight controllers or contractors proposing fast, real-time fixes that haven’t been proven on the ground first.

Office Lead
Bin Tindall

Chief of Apollo Data Priority Coordination. He is tasked with resolving disagreements between competing engineering branches and creating coherent solutions out of the many conflicting technical proposals. Focused on consensus and mission-wide benefit over any one team’s approach, he may clash with specialists or flight controllers who resist compromise on their own specialized solutions.

NASA Senior Leadership

Director
Deke Slayton

Director of Flight Crew Operations. Oversees astronaut assignments and has significant influence within NASA. Must balance crew safety, astronaut morale, and NASA’s broader objectives.

Director
Chris Kraft

NASA’s Director of Flight Operations. One of the most senior figures overseeing human spaceflight operations. Represents NASA’s upper management and can clash with Mission Control over authority and risk.

Director
Bob Gilruth

Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center. A senior NASA administrator responsible for the center overseeing Mission Control. Must deal with both the technical crisis and its institutional consequences.

Administrator
Thomas Paine

Responsible for the agency as a whole and must consider political, public-relations, and budgetary consequences alongside the safety of the astronauts.

Specialist
George Mueller

Former senior NASA human-spaceflight official and influential aerospace administrator. Can represent institutional pressure to maintain NASA’s reputation and the Apollo program’s momentum.

Director
Dr. Charles Berry

NASA’s Director of Medical Operations. Responsible for the astronauts’ medical well-being and can raise concerns about oxygen, carbon dioxide, exhaustion, temperature, nutrition, and other physiological issues.

Astronauts, Contractors, and Scientists

Manager
James McDivitt

Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager. He oversees the engineering integrity of the spacecraft program as a whole. Focusing on systemic, big-picture trade-offs and solutions, he may conflict with contractors or specialists developing solutions that would only benefit their specific subsystem.

Specialist
MSCE Team

Manned Spacecraft Center Engineering Team: A representative delegation of MSC engineering staff. Can challenge Mission Control decisions with technical arguments and calculations.

Astronaut
Richard Gordon

Apollo astronaut and experienced member of NASA’s astronaut corps. Can provide an astronaut’s perspective on spacecraft procedures, crew psychology, and operational risks from the ground.

Company
Grumman Aerospace

Representative of the company that built the Lunar Module. Possesses specialized knowledge of LM systems and can argue about what the vehicle can realistically handle.

Company
North American Rockwell

Representative of the company responsible for the Command/Service Module. Focused on spacecraft capabilities and limitations and may disagree with Grumman engineers about which spacecraft should bear more responsibility.

Company
MIT Instrumentation Lab

Representative of the team responsible for Apollo’s guidance and navigation technology. Can provide technical expertise concerning navigation and the spacecraft’s ability to return safely to Earth.

Specialist
NASA Lunar Science Team

Represents the scientific community whose primary objective is completing the lunar mission and obtaining scientific data. This creates a useful conflict with delegates who want to abandon mission objectives in favor of safety.

Engineer
Ed Smylie

NASA crew systems engineer responsible for the development of life support systems, spacesuits, and other crew equipment items for projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. His creative problem-solving skills allow him to devise solutions not found in the deep technicalities of spaceflight.

Physicist
James Van Allen

Physicist and namesake of the Van Allen radiation belts, Allen is a prominent and vocal critic within the science community who believes NASA overstated the scientific value of crewed missions relative to their cost and risk. He has argued that robotic and unmanned missions delivered greater scientific value at lower cost and risk than sending astronauts. He may push back against NASA leadership and mission planners who prioritize crew safety and space program continuity over questioning whether human spaceflight is worth the risks.

Astronaut
Ken Mattingly

Originally designated command module pilot before being removed due to exposure to measles. Prior to Apollo 13, he was the astronaut representative during the development of the Apollo spacesuit and backpack. His extensive training for the Apollo 13 mission and his background as a highly technically skilled astronaut bring deep knowledge of the spacecraft itself and the experiences of the Apollo 13 crew.

Astronaut
Alan Shepard

Chief of the Astronaut Office. One of NASA’s most prominent astronauts. Represents the interests of the astronaut corps and can pressure NASA leadership to prioritize crew safety.

Washington and the Public

Officer
John ‘Shorty’ Powers

NASA Public Affairs Officer responsible for communicating with the press and public. Has to decide how much information about problems aboard Apollo 13 should be released and when.

Administrator
James Webb

Former NASA Administrator and influential political figure associated with the agency. Can serve as a bridge between NASA and Washington, emphasizing the political stakes of Apollo.

Secretary
Melvin Laird

Secretary of Defense. Responsible for considering whether military resources could assist NASA, particularly communications, tracking, transportation, or recovery capabilities.

Vice President
Spiro Agnew

Vice President and chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Represents political oversight of the space program and can push NASA leadership for information and contingency planning.

NORAD Commander
General John W. Vogt

Represents U.S. military aerospace surveillance and tracking capabilities. Could become involved if Apollo 13’s trajectory or communications require military assistance.

Journalist
Walter Cronkite

Prominent CBS journalist covering the Apollo program. Represents the media’s demand for information and can pressure NASA to disclose problems. Cronkite argues from a national platform with broader political reach.

Ambassador

Anatoly Dobrynin

Soviet ambassador to the United States. Focuses on the broader Cold War, US-Soviet relations, and the consequences that the crisis and its possible failure or success could bring.

Senator

Clinton P. Anderson

Chair of the Senate space committee, overseeing NASA funding. Concerned that another Apollo disaster could threaten future missions and funding.

Relative

Marilyn Lovell

Wife of mission commander, Jim Lovell. She manages her family’s public presence and NASA’s relationship with the press throughout the crisis. Focused on crew safety and transparency for the families and the public, she may counter leadership or public relations figures who prioritize controlled messaging and withholding information.

USSR Rep.

Vasily Mishin

Head of the Soviet space program. Represents the USSR’s competitive stake in the space race and speaks with technical authority on the risks of crewed spaceflight more broadly. As the head of a rival superpower’s program, he could serve as a rational, outside voice, pushing the committee to weigh safety and program credibility over national pride.

Journalist

Local Newspaper Reporter

A fictional journalist investigating rumors of technical problems aboard Apollo 13. Their local reporting lets them speak to the perspectives of the broader civilian and NASA population in Houston, focusing on the immediate, local stakes of the crisis.

President

Richard Nixon

U.S. President. Has enormous political stakes in the success of Apollo and must decide how directly the White House should become involved as the situation develops.



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Back matter

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This and That

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And hope everyone has a great time at Model United Nations this year.



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